Indiana Police Officer Fails to Provide Evidence of Discriminatory Motive for His Discipline

By: Loyd Willaford and Clive Pontusson

In Cobsy v. City of Indianapolis, a federal court dismissed the lawsuit of a police officer who claimed that his repeated discipline was motivated by racial bias in the Indianapolis Police Department. Because Officer Cosby did not present evidence that his multiple suspensions were related to his race, he could not state a claim for racial discrimination.

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Federal Court Rules That Alabama Police Officer Can Bring Case for Retaliatory Transfer to Night Shift

By: Loyd Willaford and Clive Pontusson

In Jones v. City of Birmingham, a federal court ruled that an Alabama Police Officer had alleged sufficient facts to show he may have been transferred as retaliation for filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Court dismissed Edwin Jones’ claim for racial discrimination, but it did find that Jones had shown a potential retaliation for his filing a complaint with the EEOC. As a result, the Court determined that his case should be heard by a jury. [Read more…]

Federal Court of Appeals Rules That Maine Corrections Nurse Exposed to Sexual Jokes, Degrading Comments and Spanking had “Substantial Evidence” of Sexual Harassment and Hostile Work Environment

By:  Loyd Willaford and Clive Pontusson

In Roy v. Correct Care Solutions, the U.S. Court of Appeals overturned the decision of a lower court and determined that Tara Roy had presented sufficient evidence that she faced gender discrimination and hostility to bring her case for employment discrimination before a jury. Roy’s case involved many defendants, including the private company that employed her (Correct Care), the Maine Department of Corrections, and the individual supervisors who allegedly retaliated against her for complaining about sexual harassment.

Tara Roy was employed by a private company that provided medical services in Maine correctional facilities. In 2012, a Corrections Officer made sexual jokes and degrading comments about women to Roy. He also bent her over a chair and spanked her. Roy complained about the behavior, and the Officer was reassigned. A year later, a different Corrections Officer made other comments to Roy, like “a woman’s job is to be at home.” Roy reported these comments as well, but neither the company nor the department of Corrections took any action. Later, a third Corrections Officer responded to a work-related request from Roy by saying she should “stop being a bitch.” Roy and the third Corrections Officer had a romantic relationship that had ended, but he continued sending her explicit photos of himself. Roy was also repeatedly pressured by several other male Officers to give them confidential information about inmates that she was not allowed to give. Roy complained about these incidents to her superiors, but the investigations that occurred did not result in any discipline or corrective action. Roy also complained that at one point, despite her requests, Corrections Officers had not guarded prisoners in the infirmary. Roy claimed in an incident report that the Officers had been absent for 15 minutes. Video footage indicated that officers were only absent for two minutes. On the basis of this inconsistency, Roy’s security clearance was revoked and she was fired.

Roy argued that this course of events violated her rights in several ways. First, she argued that the repeated abuse she suffered at the hands of male Corrections Officers made her work environment hostile. She argued that this was specifically related to the fact that she was a woman. She further argued that her employer and the jail were both liable because they knew what was going on but did nothing to stop it. Second, Roy argued that her termination was retaliation for her efforts to bring this discrimination and abuse to light. She argued that the employer’s given reason—her misleading statement about exactly how long officers were not supervising the infirmary—was only a pretext to fire her. The real reason, she argued, was that she alleged sexual harassment by other members of the jail’s staff.

Correct Care Solutions argued that that Roy had not proven any of the critical elements of her lawsuit. It argued that, to the extent anyone harassed Roy, it was not obviously because of her identity as a woman. Correct Care also argued that even assuming Roy had been harassed, these were isolated incidents, and not the pattern of sexual harassment that is required to establish a hostile work environment. Second, Correct Care argued that Roy had not proven that her alleged dishonesty was not a valid independent reason for firing her. Finally, Correct Care argued that since the hostile work environment and the “retaliation” also involved employees of the jail, it was impossible for them to correct the behavior that Roy was describing.

The federal court did not determine that Roy had proven her case—but it did issue a forceful ruling that she had alleged enough facts to bring her case before a jury.  The Court found that:

A jury could find on one of several theories that officers put Roy at risk, treated her rudely, ignored her, demeaned her, and filed reports complaining about her not only because of her whistleblowing but also because of her sex. […] Responding disrespectfully or dismissively to women’s requests, complaining about women’s performance, and ignoring or ostracizing women are paradigmatic ways to communicate to women that they are less worthy than or less welcome than men in a workplace.

The Court also explained that the facts on the record showed that retaliation may have been the reason she was fired. As the Court explained,

If CCS could have transferred Roy to one of its other facilities in Maine, as Roy says, then a jury could find that retaliatory animus was a but-for cause of CCS’s decision to fire her rather than transfer her. Significantly, CCS has not produced evidence that a transfer was impossible.

Finally, the court explained that the somewhat complex relationship between the jail and Correct Care Solutions did not mean that Roy could not bring a lawsuit against both of them:

A third party’s retaliatory or discriminatory animus can cause an employer’s adverse action where, as a jury might find here, the employer knew that animus motivated the third-party’s actions or demands and simply accepted those actions or demands.

For these reasons, the Federal Court of Appeals determined that Roy’s case should go before a jury to weigh the evidence of discrimination, hostility, and retaliation that she had presented.

This case is an example of the types of conduct which can constitute a hostile work environment based on sex. The standard that courts apply is that the bad conduct must be “severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment.” The bad conduct must also be either done or tolerated by management. In this case the repeated sexualized jokes and comments by Roy’s co-workers which management knew about and did not correct were enough to allow a jury to decide that they altered the working conditions to create hostile work environment.   

The case also stands for the propositions that employers cannot hide behind third party contractors to avoid liability. If the employer knew or should have known about the third party’s bad conduct and did not correct it, the employer may be found liable if they had the means to correct the behavior and failed to do so.

 

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New York Port Authority Safety Officer Cannot Move Forward with Rehabilitation Act Claim after Injury

By: Loyd Willaford and Matt Baker

In Itzhaki v. Port Auth. of N.Y & N.J., a port authority public safety officer claimed that she was discriminated against on the basis of an injury sustained at work. The officer alleged that she would have been promoted to sergeant but for her injury.  The Port Authority moved for summary judgement and argued that her injury precluded her from being on the job and therefore that she couldn’t perform the essential functions of the job. The U.S. Federal Court for the Southern District of New York agreed and granted the Port Authority’s motion.

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Federal Court Holds that Indiana State Police Academy Made Reasonable Effort to Accommodate Recruit with Diabetes

By: Cynthia McNabb and Clive Pontusson

In Reeder v. Carter, a recruit with the Indiana State Patrol brought suit in federal district court alleging that he had been discriminated against on account of his disability. Dillon Reeder had begun the ISP Recruit Academy and performed well, but was diagnosed with Diabetes and had to be hospitalized. During his treatment, the State Patrol made efforts to accommodate his condition, including special meals and reduced physical activity. However, the Patrol believed that Reeder could not complete the training program.  Further, Reeder did not complete all of the coursework as part of the training program while he was in the hospital and when he was released from the hospital but not allowed to perform full-duty physical activities. As a result, Reeder was dismissed from the Academy. He was given the option of attending the Academy the following year, and also given the option of accepting a civilian job with the Patrol as a dispatcher. Reeder refused both offers. He filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, claiming that the State Patrol had not done enough to accommodate his condition. The court disagreed, and found that the Patrol had done everything required by the law to attempt to accommodate Reeder’s disability. The court therefore dismissed Reeder’s lawsuit.

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Oklahoma Officer’s Lawsuit for Gender Discrimination May Continue

By: Loyd Willaford and Clive Pontusson

In Webb v. City of Eufaula, a federal court in Oklahoma ruled that a female employee had offered enough facts and evidence to bring her lawsuit for gender discrimination to trial. Candy Webb was the only woman employed as a Police Officer by the City of Eufaula, and was subjected to different standards of training and fitness than other Officers. She was fired by the Police Department and filed a lawsuit. [Read more…]

Federal Court Rules that City of Chicago did not Fail to Accommodate Psychologically Unfit Paramedic

By: Cynthia McNabb and Clive Pontusson

In a case that was decided on summary judgment, the federal court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the City of Chicago did not fail to accommodate or discriminate against Plaintiff, a fire paramedic in violation of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA).  Specifically, the Court ruled that the Plaintiff, a fire paramedic with chronic Bell’s palsy employed by the City of Chicago, had failed to show that discrimination was the cause of her being sent to three fit-for-duty evaluations and being placed on involuntary leave.

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Officer’s Use of Medication Does Not Prove He Is Disabled

By: Cynthia McNabb and Clive Pontusson

In Jeannot v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, a federal court in Pennsylvania dismissed the lawsuit of a Police Officer who sued his employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act for retaliating against him because he had a disability. The Court dismissed Jeannot’s lawsuit because he did not prove that he had a disability that would qualify for protection under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

Jeffrey Jeannot had been a Police Officer with the Philadelphia Housing Authority for several years. While on patrol with another Officer, Jeannot stopped into a pharmacy to fill a prescription for Adderall. Jeannot was prescribed Adderall by his doctor “so that he could maintain focus necessary for him to perform his duties as a police officer.” Jeannot had previously informed his supervisor that he took Adderall, however had not articulated to his supervisor that such use was for a specific medical condition.  Jeannot had also not requested any form of accommodation under the ADA Later, Jeannot’s superiors apparently became suspicious, and required him to submit to a drug test. Jeannot was then suspended from his job for drug use. He filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. He argued that his concentration issues were a condition that qualified as a disability, that he was nevertheless qualified to be a police officer, and that his employer suspended him because he was disabled. [Read more…]

Florida Sheriff’s Department May Have Had “Mixed Motive” in Demoting Female Officer

By:  Loyd Willaford and Clive Pontusson

In Montoya v. Morgan, a female employee of a Florida Sheriff’s Department filed a lawsuit for gender discrimination in violation of federal law. Laura Montoya argued that widespread sexism in the Sheriff’s department created a hostile work environment and that she was wrongfully discharged because of gender bias in the Sheriff’s Department. The Court ruled that she had not proven that she suffered from a hostile work environment. However, based on the facts presented, the Court determined that gender discrimination could have been a part of her employer’s decision to fire her. As a result, that component of her lawsuit was allowed to continue.

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U.S. Marshall’s Age Discrimination Claim Dismissed Because He Could Not Prove Employer’s Action was Adverse

By: Loyd Willaford and Matt Baker

In Gloetzner v. Lynch, a U.S. Deputy Marshall brought a suit alleging age discrimination under the ADEA against the U.S. Department of Justice. Marshall brought a number of claims of discriminatory treatment but all but one were all dismissed as having been brought too late. The one claim that the Court did not dismiss as timebarred was Marshall’s claim that he applied to be able to attend a firearms training session but was passed over in favor of a younger colleague.  The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida granted the defendants motion for summary judgement, holding that the Marshall had not stated a meritorious claim on this.

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