By Rick Gautschi
In City of Houston v. Proler, No. 14-10-00971-CV, Texas Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District, May 31, 2012 , during March 2006, a captain in a fire suppression unit in the Houston Fire Department (HFD) responded, along with firefighters that he supervised, to a building fire. While at the scene of the fire, the captain failed to follow orders and was found standing in a smoke-filled room. Medics at the scene determined that his blood pressure was low. Subsequently, at the direction of the HFD, he sought medical treatment. The treating physician diagnosed him with global transient amnesia and informed the HFD of the diagnosis. A few days later, the physician released the captain to full duty. Prior to the incident that resulted in the diagnosis, unnamed firefighters had told a Chief at the HFD that either the captain was afraid of firefighting or “his head goes out on him” when confronted by a firefighting situation. Subsequent to the March 2006 incident, the same Chief sent, to another chief, a letter outlining his concerns about the captain’s behavior at the fire. As a result of the letter, the second Chief transferred the captain to an HFD training academy. While at the academy, he had no involvement in fire suppression. Despite the captain’s repeated requests to transfer into a fire suppression unit, the HFD kept him at the academy for approximately thirteen months. He experienced no other incidents of global transient amnesia. As the result of a hearing examiner’s decision on a grievance that the union pursued on his behalf, the HFD transferred the captain to a fire suppression unit. Regardless, as result of the transfer to the academy he sued the HFD for disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and an analogous Texas statute .
The Texas Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District explained that under both the ADA and the Texas statute an employee has a disability if, for example, the employer regards him as being substantially limited in his ability to think as the result of what the employer believes is a physical or mental impairment.
The Court found that substantial evidence supported a jury’s determination that the employer erroneously believed that the captain was disabled, i.e., was significantly restricted in his ability to think in particular circumstances compared to the average person in those circumstances. Further, substantial evidence supported a determination that the employer based, at least in part, its decision to transfer the captain on that erroneous belief.
At the same time, the evidence supported a finding that the employer transferred the captain because it had concluded he was afraid of firefighting, a circumstance that neither the ADA nor the Texas statute prohibits. Regardless, the employer violated both the ADA and the Texas statute because the decision to transfer the captain was based in part on the erroneous belief that he was disabled.
