By: Loyd Willaford and Clive Pontusson
In Hollant v. City of North Miami, a federal court in Florida ruled that an officer who was fired for alleged misconduct may continue with a lawsuit arguing that his termination violated his constitutional rights. Following an officer-involved shooting, Hollant was falsely accused of falsifying records by another Officer, and later by a City Councilman. Despite the fact that Hollant was not the Officer who shot someone, he was then moved into a pre-disciplinary proceeding. He was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses against him, and he alleged he was not given an opportunity to clear his name. The Court determined that Hollant had brought forward enough facts showing that he was denied due process of law, and that therefore he could sue the City and many of his supervisors. Hollant argued that he was caught up in a rush to judgment following a complex situation. He argued that the statements made by the Chief of Police and the City Councilman were made publicly, in the course of a news conference, and that they were very damaging to his reputation. He argued that because these statements were false, he had a right to “clear his name.” However, he was not given an opportunity to do this at a later pre-disciplinary hearing. In fact, “despite internal disagreements” about the evidence presented at the hearing, Hollant was fired. Hollant asked the city’s personnel review board to examine the decision, but his request was denied. Officer Hollant argued that this was not a fair investigation, and that his due process rights were violated.
The City of North Miami met these arguments in two different ways. First, the City argued that Hollant had received a pre-termination hearing, and the Department did investigate the circumstances that lead to their ultimate decision to fire Hollant. The City argued that these things were enough to satisfy Officer Hollant’s right to due process. The City of North Miami also argued that the statements which damaged Hollant’s reputation were made by public officials, speaking in their official capacity—as a result these statements were “privileged” and so the City officials could not be held liable in court for making them.
The Court denied the City’s request to dismiss Hollant’s lawsuit at this early stage. It began by recognizing “the existence of a liberty interest in one’s good name” and that:
An employer must provide an employee the opportunity for a name clearing hearing when it publicizes stigmatizing information.
The Court also determined that Hollant had a right to due process before his job could be taken away. It summarized that,
In procedural due process claims, the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in “life, liberty, or property” is not in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such interest without due process of law.
The Court was careful to note that Hollant’s situation was not exactly cut and dry, because, “there is no case holding that a municipal employee who received a pre-determination hearing has a clearly established right to a name clearing hearing. Nevertheless, since Hollant’s lawsuit was in its early stages, the Court decided that it was too soon to dismiss his claims. He had at least provided enough facts to state a claim and made an allegation that his most fundamental constitutional rights had been violated by city employees. As a result, his lawsuit will continue through the Courts.
This case illustrates how Courts handle claims of a violation of due process. Because Hollant was able to show he had a right to have a hearing before being suspended without pay, the failure of the City to give him this hearing meant that Hollant could show a constitutional violation, even if Hollant was given a pre-termination hearing later. The case also illustrates an important procedural problem with suits against government officials. This is the problem of qualified immunity and privilege. Here, the officials made what were arguably reckless and false statements which harmed Hollant. But because the statements were made in an official capacity, under Florida law, Hollant had no remedy for them. The reason for this doctrine of privilege is to protect public officials from suits related to statements they make as officials. In Washington State, while certain activities are privileged, (legislative debate, judicial statements, attorney statement in litigation, etc) Washington does not have this blanket privilege for all public officials the way Florida does. Washington applies a “qualified privilege” to statements made in an official capacity, but this privilege can be lost if the official acts in “reckless disregard” of the truth. It is possible that had this case occurred in Washington, Hollant’s defamation case might not have been dismissed.
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