By Erica Shelley Nelson and Brennen Johnson
In Williams v. Silver Spring Volunteer Fire Department, the U.S. District Court in Maryland denied a Fire Department’s motion for summary judgment against a volunteer firefighter claiming that the Department retaliated against her for engaging in protected speech. Specifically, the volunteer firefighter alleged that one of her supervisors publicly berated her for filing a sexual harassment charge against him with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and that this public humiliation violated Title VII. Although the Department argued that the volunteer firefighter did not suffer any “adverse employment actions” within the meaning of Title VII, the Court determined that the public shaming was sufficient to constitute an adverse action because it might dissuade an employee from exercising her Title VII rights.
Susan Williams joined the Silver Spring Fire Department as a volunteer firefighter in 2007. While serving as a volunteer, she performed services as an EMT. Although the Department and Williams dispute whether or not she received any monetary rewards for her service, they both agree that her service made her eligible to receive fringe benefits including disability, death, and survivor benefits. In her lawsuit, Williams alleged that over the course of her employment, the deputy chief in charge of her supervision regularly subjected her to sexually suggestive comments, inappropriately touched her, and “engaged in stalker-like behavior.” In 2008, Williams complained of the behavior to one of her superiors. The matter was quickly referred to the battalion chief who verbally reprimanded the deputy chief and instructed him not to interact with Williams in the future. Nevertheless, the deputy chief continued to harass Williams. When the unwelcome behavior continued, Williams renewed her complaints to members of the Department’s Board. Unfortunately, according to Williams’ complaints, the harassment continued and the Department did nothing more to stop it.
As a result of the continuing harassment, Williams filed a sex discrimination charge with the EEOC in 2009. On January 4, 2010, Williams attended a monthly Fire Department meeting where the deputy chief was also present. At the meeting, the deputy chief began to publicly berate Williams for filing an EEOC complaint and persisted to do so despite efforts by his superiors to stop the verbal attack. Subsequently, Williams was restricted from working at certain times and denied multiple training opportunities.
Williams received a “right to sue” letter from the EEOC in 2013, based on the information from her original complaint. She then filed her lawsuit against the department, alleging that the deputy chief’s behavior constituted ongoing discriminatory harassment, that the Department did nothing to stop it, and that the deputy chief retaliated against her for filing the EEOC complaint. The Department responded to the Williams’ claim by arguing that the deputy chief’s verbal attack could not constitute retaliation because it did not constitute an “adverse employment action.”
In its decision, the Court explained that, to be successful in her lawsuit, Williams needed to show that (1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) the Fire Department took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a “causal link” between the protected activity and adverse action. Accordingly, if Williams did not suffer from an “adverse employment action” as the Department claimed, then her lawsuit would fail. The Court then addressed the meaning of “adverse employment action.” It explained:
[F]or a retaliation claim, a plaintiff need only show that she suffered an action that was materially adverse, meaning that the action might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination… Indeed, the anti-retaliation provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment; rather, it is meant to include acts, that objectively speaking, carry a significant risk of humiliation, damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to future employment prospects.
Applying this definition of “adverse employment action,” the Court reached the following conclusion:
Here, a reasonable juror could find that the actions upon which Williams relies might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination… [The deputy chief] publicly berated Williams for filing an EEOC complaint. This public shaming occurred in the presence of Williams’ colleagues… Under these circumstances, a reasonable juror could conclude that such aggressive and humiliating behavior carried out by one’s supervisor in the presence of numerous colleagues could dissuade a reasonable employee from exercising his or her rights under Title VII. This is not to suggest that all forms of public humiliation carried out by one’s supervisor amount to an adverse employment action; but where, as here, the conduct was directly motivated by the plaintiff’s decision to exercise her Title VII rights and the purpose of the conduct was to publicly shame the plaintiff for exercising those rights, the Court finds that, at the very least, a jury should determine whether the conduct amounts to an adverse employment action.
Based on this reasoning, the Court determined that Williams had alleged a plausible case against the Fire Department for retaliation. It accordingly denied the Department’s motion for summary judgment and ordered that the case proceed to a trial before a jury.
The definition and interpretation of what constitutes “adverse employment action” has evolved in the courts. More clear adverse actions are termination, a refusal to hire, or a denial of a promotion. But adverse actions may also include threats, or unjustified, negative performance reviews. Essentially, actions that are taken by an employer to prevent an employee from opposing a discriminatory practice, or participating in an employment discrimination proceeding may rise to the level of adverse action. On the other hand, petty slights and annoyances are not considered adverse actions. The Court definitely reached in this case, albeit cautiously, in holding that “humiliation” may constitute an adverse employment action. The fact the conduct occurred in front of other colleagues, and was perpetrated by a superior most certainly persuaded the Court. Had the conduct occurred privately or was done by a colleague (instead of a superior), the Court may have reached a different conclusion in this case.
