By Mitchell Riese and Mitchel Wilson
In DeStefano v. City of Philadelphia, the Court dismissed cross motions for summary judgment, concluding that Orlando DeStefano’s disability discrimination claims under the federal Rehabilitation Act may go to trial for a knee injury when the issue is whether patrolling is part of a lieutenant’s essential functions.
DeStefano has been on the force since 1965, and injured his knee when he tripped on crime scene tape in 2008. He was placed on “injured on duty” status, receiving pay while not reporting to work for one year. After surgery and physical therapy, DeStefano returned to work on limited duty with Internal Affairs. The City’s Medical Director interviewed and evaluated DeStefano, and concluded that his injury stemmed from a preexisting degenerative knee condition and that he was permanently disabled; the Commissioner then sent him a letter informing DeStefano that he was “separated” from the force. He turned down a lesser paying position with the City, took a Deferred Retirement Option Plan payment and brought suit.
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court asks if there are any disputed questions of material fact that must be determined after a trial. Under the Rehabilitation Act, DeStefano must show he was disabled, was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the position, and that he suffered an adverse employment action. Here, it is undisputed that he is disabled, as his knee injury significantly interferes with the life activity of walking and standing; it is also undisputed that he was removed from his position as lieutenant. However, the remaining issue is whether he could perform the essential functions of the position, namely patrol duties, and whether they were an essential function of the position. The Court concluded that the issues of whether patrol was an essential function and whether DeStefano could perform patrol duty were issues for trial that could not be resolved on summary judgment:
The City proffers evidence that a police lieutenant’s job entails “supervis[ing] officers in the field” and that lieutenants “are deployed to the street first when the Department deems it necessary.” By contrast, DeStefano proffers the City of Philadelphia’s Personnel Department’s job description of “police lieutenant” and asserts that “nothing in the job description, at all, that requires lieutenants to perform routine patrol work.” The parties’ conflicting evidence “creates a factual dispute that underlies [the City’s] legal argument as to the essential functions of” a police lieutenant that is material to determining whether the City discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of his disability. Therefore, there exists a dispute of material fact and the Court must deny summary judgment as to both parties.
The Court further concluded that even if patrolling is an essential function of the position, DeStefano could still show that he was capable of performing it and that it too was an issue for trial.
This case illustrates the important principle that in disability discrimination cases, it is frequently necessary to determine what the “essential functions” of the employee’s job are on an individual basis, despite what the employer’s written job description might state. This may require the testimony of witnesses and the introduction of certain evidence to show whether, in fact, a particular job responsibility that is claimed by the employer to be an “essential function” is, in fact, an essential function within the meaning of the law.
