By Mitchel Wilson
In Aldridge v. Lake Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, an Illinois federal trial court dismissed the Lake County’s motion for summary judgment and permitted a female deputy’s gender discrimination claims to go to trial. The Court concluded, the various evidence including the statements that the Sheriff “wanted to give the boys a chance” at the K-9 assignment, was enough to demonstrate a viable discrimination claim.
Heather Aldridge was a deputy for 16 years, received satisfactory job performance, and served on special duty canine unit twice. She is one of 13 female deputies out of a total of 195. In 1999, Aldridge and another female deputy joined the K9 unit because it had increased status and pay – ten years later, early 2009, the department announced it was retiring the female deputies’ dogs. However, unlike male K9 members who received new dogs, the department required the female deputies to reapply and interview with new applicants.
Aldridge complained, and the Sheriff Mark Curran, explained he wanted “new blood.” The Undersheriff admitted that the Sherriff “wanted to give the boys a chance” but that she would receive a new dog. She did, but the other female deputy was replaced. Although Aldridge had only received one written warning the previous year, she began receiving “write-ups, verbal reprimands, and warnings” in 2009 and received her first written discipline in 15 years in 2010.
The discipline resulted from a misunderstanding. Responding to a report of a dead dog at a school, Aldridge found a plastic coyote – believing it a prank, Aldridge took the coyote and put it in her trunk. Several months later, the school reported a missing plastic coyote decoy and she explained she had it and would return it. In a complaint, the Superintendent indicated that Aldridge was unprofessional and appeared “angry and annoyed.” Two months later, a sergeant followed up on the decoy, and the Union notified Aldridge to enter the coyote into evidence immediately; she admitted it the next day. As a result, Sherriff Curran demoted Aldridge from her position on the K9 unit and replaced her with a male K9 handler, who washed out 18 months later.
The County first attempts to suppress one potential claim on a technicality; that Aldridge failed to check the proper box on her Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEOC”) charge sheet. However, the court does not agree with the County because Aldridge submitted the charge without legal assistance and there is no specific box for a “hostile work environment.” The court dismisses the defendant’s argument here and explains that . . .
The ultimate gage is whether the allegations in the complaint describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals as those found in the EEOC charge. Here, plaintiff’s EEOC charge does not implicate any individual or detail any particular conduct on the part of defendant. But we find that though the focus of her charge was general, “one could expect that the EEOC investigation would have grown to look at” her work performance in her particular office environment, implicating the same principle players for both her claims.
In showing a hostile work environment, the court agrees with the County, that there are not enough facts alleged to show that any discriminatory conduct was so severe as to “affect her work performance or her psychological well being.” It reasoned that although there is a cause of action for defendant’s demotion and any unfounded discipline because of her gender, they do not arise into an independent legal cause of action under a theory of hostile work environment.
Under a title VII discrimination claims Aldridge shows she is a member of a protected class by being female, meeting the first prong, and suffered an adverse employer action, the second prong by losing out on $38,000-50,000 per year from her demotion. The direct evidence Aldridge offers, is the Sheriff stating he wanted to “give the boys a chance” and the indirect evidence is her removal and replacement by a male officer. This gives rise to an inference of discriminatory motive and, the court concluded, is proper for a jury and trial.
