By Rick Gautschi
In Jeudy v. Attorney General, Department of Justice, No. 11-15838, Slip. Opinion, July 26, 2012, 11th Cir.,during her probationary period of employment, a pregnant corrections officer informed her employer that as the result of her pregnancy, she experienced severe pelvic pain caused by fibroids on her uterus.
According to the officer, the severe pain limited her ability to walk, stand and climb stairs. She requested an accommodation in the form of being allowed to change her shift and work while seated. The employer denied her request and subsequently terminated her employment after she committed two separate work infractions within a few days of each other. Following her termination, she claimed that by failing to accommodate her disability and discharging her, the employer had discriminated against her on the basis of her disability and her sex in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In assessing the claims the 11th Circuit explained, first, that although pregnancy is not a disability under the Rehabilitation Act, a pregnancy-related impairment may be a disability if it substantially limits a major life activity. Under the law, standing and walking are major life activities. The former officer did not explain how the severe pelvic pain affected her ability to stand or walk. Further, she testified that the pain was “off and on” and that the situation had improved shortly before her termination. In short, she introduced no evidence to demonstrate that she had a disability. Further, in even if she had shown that she had a pregnancy related disability, discrimination on the basis of the pregnancy and/or the pregnancy related disability would require an adverse employment action. An adverse employment action requires a serious material change in the terms, conditions or privileges of one’s employment. The employer agreed to allow the former officer to transfer to another shift if she could find someone who was willing to trade shifts with her. No one was willing to do so. That circumstance did not qualify as an adverse employment action. Although termination of employment is such an action, the employer explained that it terminated her because of her two work infractions. She introduced no evidence that the employer’s explanation for the decision to terminate her was, in fact, a pretext for discrimination. As a result, the Court affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of her lawsuit.
